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OUT OF SERVICE: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
RUSSIA’S SUSPENSION OF JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
UNITED STATES UNDER THE HAGUE SERVICE
CONVENTION
SPENCER WILLIG*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Somewhere in the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, nestled
in the “Mecca of international law,”1 there is a file containing the
ratification instruments for the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters.2 A researcher confined to this Dutch filing
cabinet could reasonably conclude that judicial assistance flows
freely between Russia and the United States under the Convention.
Both states have ratified it,3 and neither country has entered
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.A.
Candidate, May 2010, Lauder Institute of Management and International Studies,
University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2006, University of Pennsylvania. This Note
and its Author owe their existence to Drs. Rosette and Kenneth Willig.
1 See, e.g., Guillaume Sacriste & Antoine Vauchez, The Force of International
Law: Lawyers’ Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s, 32 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 83, 89–90 (2007) (observing that the capital of the Netherlands has been
considered the “Mecca of international law” since the early 1920s).
2 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters art. 26, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention or Convention]
(designating the depository location for the instruments of ratification).
3 Hague Convention on Private International Law, Status Table: 14:
Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, http://www.hcch.net
/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17 [hereinafter Hague Service
Convention Status Table] (providing a comprehensive listing of countries and
their signatory status regarding the Hague Service Convention. See also RSM
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reservations or declarations expressly declining to recognize the
other’s rights under the Convention.4
This commitment to mutual judicial assistance should be a
triumph for the Hague Conference. Russia and the United States
have fundamentally different legal systems5 and a uniquely
complicated political relationship.6 Setting aside the antagonism
that often characterizes Russo-American relations,7 simply
building a workable transnational litigation bridge between a civil
and a common law jurisdiction would be a significant feather in
the Hague Conference’s cap.8
Russo-American judicial cooperation in the world beyond the
Convention’s pages, however, leaves much to be desired. Russia
effectively severed Hague Service Convention ties with U.S. courts
in July 2003 and continues to rebuff efforts to restore “normal
judicial cooperation.”9
Though this policy is purportedly
grounded in Russia’s interpretation of Article 12 of the
Convention, this Note will demonstrate that Russia’s legal
Production Corp. v. Fridman, Civ. A. No. 06-11512, 2007 WL 2295907, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007) (approaching analysis of service under the Hague Service
Convention “with the understanding that the convention is currently in force”
between Russia and the United States).
4 The Hague Conference on Private International Law maintains a
comprehensive listing of each member state’s declarations and reservations on its
website. Hague Service Convention Status Table, supra note 3.
5 Russia and the United States feature civil and common law legal systems,
respectively. See, e.g., Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A
Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083, 1107 n.125 (2008)
(identifying major civil and common law jurisdictions). As discussed in Section 3,
infra, the development of the Russian legal community and its role in private
international law policy-making also differs significantly from the corresponding
narrative in the United States.
6 See infra Section 3.
7 See, e.g., Alexei Arbatov, Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda,
FOREIGN POL’Y, Autumn 1996, at 102, 117 (describing the fragility of
“nonconfrontational” relations between the United States and Russia).
8 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1183, 1190 (2004) (identifying the “promised reconciliation” of differing civil and
common law litigation practices as a major goal of the Hague Conference regime).
9 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Russia Judicial Assistance,
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_3831.html (last visited Dec. 6,
2009) [hereinafter State Department Website]. This source also provides a brief
summary of the breakdown in Hague Service Convention relations from the
perspective of the U.S. government. See also Kuklachev v. Gelfman, No. 08-CV2214 (CPS), 2008 WL 5068860, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008) (noting Russia has
suspended judicial cooperation with the United States, although it remains a
signatory to the Hague Service Convention).
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argument is pretextual. Analysis of Russia’s Hague Service
Convention participation in the context of the country’s foreign
policy agenda, judicial system, and legal culture suggests that the
collapse of the Convention channel was caused by the very
differences the Hague Conference is supposed to overcome.
Exploration of the factors behind Russia’s suspension of
Convention cooperation with the United States invites discussion
of the implications for parties in U.S. courts seeking to effect
service on Russian soil, and for the future of transnational litigation
generally. Each of these issues will be addressed below.
First, however, a quick overview of the Hague system is in
order. The remainder of this Section will survey the Hague Service
Convention regime, identify the Convention’s status under
Russian and U.S. law, and review basic facts surrounding the
Russo-American dispute over the application of the Convention
between the two states.
1.1. The Hague Service Convention: Origins, Importance, and
Structure
The Hague Service Convention is a product of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law [hereinafter Hague
Conference], an “intergovernmental organization with its own
legal personality under public international law.”10 The Hague
Conference is the premiere international body working to develop
a unified private international law regime.11 The Hague Service
Convention itself, with fifty-nine contracting states including all of
the members of the G8,12 is intended to apply in “all cases, in civil
or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”13 The
Hague Service Convention’s status as the standard legal

10 Andrea Schulz, The Accession of the European Community to the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 939, 939 (2007).
11 Id. at 949. See also Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct
Field? The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 301, 313 (2008) (describing the Hague Conference as “the leading international
organization devoted to facilitating international judicial cooperation through
multilateral treaties”).
12 Hague Service Convention Status Table, supra note 3.
13 Hague Service Convention, supra note 2.
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framework governing transnational service is unlikely to change in
the near future.14
A key feature of the Hague Service regime is the “Central
Authority.”15 Under Article 2 of the Hague Service Convention,
each state party must establish a Central Authority to act as an
international service clearing house, receiving requests for service
from courts abroad and then effecting service within its borders.16
The Central Authority’s transmission of foreign judicial documents
defuses a potential “diplomatic breach-of-sovereignty concern,” as
the country in which service is sought uses its own officials to
effect service.17 Though creation of a Central Authority is
mandatory,18 member states can and have consented to alternate
methods of service under the Convention19 in addition to the basic
required Convention channel; these alternate methods include
postal and non-Hague diplomatic channels.20 Whether service is
made through a Central Authority directly or through another
approved Convention channel, “[c]ompliance with the Hague
[Service] Convention is of paramount importance to ensure
subsequent recognition of a judgment in a Hague signatory
country.”21

14 See Richard J. Hawkins, Comment, Dysfunctional Equivalence: The New
Approach to Defining “Postal Channels” Under the Hague Service Convention, 55
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 205, 213 (2007) (noting “there is significant potential for the
Convention to continue to broaden its reach across borders”).
15 Id. (characterizing the Central Authority as “the centerpiece and principal
innovation of the Convention” regime).
16 For a summary of the relevant features of the convention see
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 698–99 (1988).
17 Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Forum Shopping and Other Reflections on Litigation
Involving U.S. and European Businesses, 7 PACE INT’L L. REV. 465, 474 (1995).
18 Id.
19 See Schlunk, 386 U.S. at 699.
20 Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 10. See also Hawkins, supra
note 14, at 214.
21 Yvonne A. Tamayo, Catch Me If You Can: Serving United States Process on an
Elusive Defendant Abroad, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211, 236 (2003). Dowling also
emphasizes the heightened importance of proper service in international
litigation. Dowling, supra note 17, at 473 (“Many U.S. judgments against foreign
defendants have been rendered unenforceable due to service of process defects
established in foreign courts at the enforcement stage.”).
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1.2. Acceptance and Interpretation of the Hague Service Convention
under U.S. and Russian Law
Both the United States and Russia have signed and ratified the
Convention.22 The United States Supreme Court considers the
Convention self-executing;23 under “the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const., Art. VI, the Convention pre-empts inconsistent methods of
service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies.”24
The Russian Federation also considers itself bound by the
Convention and has passed implementing legislation to that effect
[hereinafter Russian Implementing Statute].25
The Russian
Constitution features a provision similar to the U.S. Supremacy
Clause, mandating that treaties concluded by the Russian
Federation take precedence over conflicting domestic legislation,26
unless they are declared unconstitutional by the federal
Constitutional Court.27
Russia and the United States observe the same basic principles
of treaty interpretation. Russia is a party to the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter Vienna Convention],28 while the
United States largely abides by the Vienna Convention’s terms,
Hague Status Table, supra note 3.
See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 637 n.175
(2008) (citing Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699–700) (characterizing the Hague Service
Convention as self-executing).
24 Schlunk, 486 U.S., at 699.
25 Federal’yi Zakon RF ot Feb. 12, 2001 N. 10-FZ “O Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi
Federatsii k Konventsii o Vruchenii Za Granitsei Sudebnykh i Vnesudebnykh
Dokumentov po Grazhdanskim ili Torgovym Delam” [Federal Law dated Feb. 12,
2001 No. 10-FZ “On Accession of the Russian Federation to the Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters”], Ros. Gaz. Feb. 15, 2001. [Hereinafter Russian Implementing Statute]]
26 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15, cl. 4
(“Universally recognized principles and norms of international law as well as
international agreements of the Russian Federation should be an integral part of
its legal system. If an international agreement of the Russian Federation
establishes rules, which differ from those stipulated by law, then the rules of the
international agreement shall be applied.”).
27 Id. art. 125, cl. 6 (mandating that “[a]cts or certain provisions thereof, which
are recognized as unconstitutional, shall lose force; international treaties of the
Russian Federation, which do not correspond to the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, shall not be implemented or used.”).
28 See, e.g., Peter Krug, Internalizing European Court of Human Rights
Interpretations: Russia’s Courts of General Jurisdiction and New Directions in Civil
Defamation Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 45–46 (2006) (observing that Russia is a
party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
22
23
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recognizing them as customary international law.29 In particular,
the United States has invoked — thereby implicitly recognizing —
the Vienna Convention protocols governing termination or
suspension of treaties in the event of material breach by a state
party.30
1.3. The Breakdown of Russo-American Hague Service Convention
Relations
As noted above, each party to the Convention must establish a
Central Authority to process transnational service requests.31
There has, however, been some dispute as to whether the duties of
the Central Authority must be carried out by government officials,
or whether they can be delegated to a private company32 and, in
either case, whether a fee can be charged for effecting service on
behalf of a foreign party.
The United States brought this issue to the forefront of Hague
Conference politics when it outsourced the duties of its Central
Authority to a private company. The process commenced with a
series of letters to the Hague Conference beginning in 2002 in
which the United States announced its intention to initiate (and,
eventually, its successful completion of) this privatization process.
The U.S. Department of Justice ultimately awarded the contract to
Process Forwarding International (“PFI”).33
Throughout the
process, the Department of Justice explicitly maintained that it was
merely delegating the tasks of the Central Authority and not
actually designating a new Central Authority or transferring its
ultimate responsibilities as Central Authority.34

29 See, e.g., Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 299–300 (1988) (describing
instances in which the U.S. government has demonstrated that it considers itself
bound by terms of the Vienna Convention).
30 Id. at 300; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
31 See supra Section 1.1.
32 See Emily Fishbein Johnson, Note, Privatizing the Duties of the Central
Authority: Should International Service of Process Be Up For Bid?, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 769, 778–79 (2005) (describing American efforts to construe the Hague
Convention terms more broadly in order to allow private process servers to act for
the Central Authority).
33 Letter from United States to Hague Conference Depositary (Aug. 21, 2003),
http://www.hcch.net/upload/outsourcing14.pdf.
34 Id.
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The United States formally announced to the Permanent
Bureau of the Hague Conference that PFI was assuming the duties
of the Central Authority on April 15, 2003.35 Since then, PFI has
exercised exclusive authority to transmit outgoing requests for
service of process abroad and to process incoming service requests
as it discharges the duties of the United States Central Authority
under Article 2 of the Convention.36 Since June 1, 2003,37 PFI has
charged a processing fee to cover its costs.38
Overall, PFI’s tenure as the U.S. Central Authority has been
successful. PFI has achieved much faster processing times in
effecting service in the United States than the U.S. Marshals that
carried out this duty previously, reducing turnaround time from
six months to around six weeks.39 Though a handful of Hague
Service Convention member states have registered objections to the
PFI privatization,40 it generally enjoys “international acceptance.”41
Nevertheless, the Russian government has chosen to interpret
the imposition of a fee for PFI’s services as a fundamental breach of
the Convention.42 A month after PFI began charging fees, “Russia
35 Press Release, United States of America Central Authority under the
Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Apr. 15, 2003),
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2003&varevent=5.
36 Johnson, supra note 32, at 781.
37 State Department Website, supra note 9.
38 Currently, the processing fee charged by PFI is $95 per request. See Letter
from United States to Hague Depository, supra note 33.
39 Johnson, supra note 32, at 782, 789 (concluding that outsourcing to PFI was
a success).
40 These objections and the countermeasures these states employ are
discussed below. Russia and Korea are currently the only two countries in which
PFI’s designation as the U.S. Central Authority precludes all Hague Service
Convention assistance. Id. at 789.
41 Id. at 782 (noting that the 2003 Special Commission on the Practical
Operation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence and Service Conventions determined
that the “terms of the Convention do not preclude a Central Authority from
contracting activities under the Convention to a private entity, while retaining its
status as Central Authority and ultimate responsibility for its obligations under
the Convention”).
42 For a brief description of the events that led Russia to claim the Convention
had been breached from a Russian perspective, see Aleksandr A. Chikalov,
Mezhdunarodnoe usynovlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Sudebnye porucheniia po
semeinym delam s uchastiem inostrannogo elementa [International Adoption in
the Russian Federation: Judicial Service in Family Maters Involving International
Elements] (Sept. 13 2008) available at http://www.allpravo.ru/diploma/doc39p
/instrum6233/ (Russ.).
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unilaterally suspended all judicial cooperation with the United
States in civil and commercial matters.”43 That fall, a Special
Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille,
Evidence and Service Convention convened at the Hague
Conference to discuss the role of private contractors under the
Convention. The Special Commission’s report unequivocally
states that each state party is free to “determine its own model” of
Central Authority organization, including “contracting activities
under the Convention to a private entity” while retaining the
formal status and responsibility of the Central Authority under the
Convention.44 The Russian Federation declined to support this
recommendation and reserved its position.45
Over a year later, on December 3, 2004, Russia deposited a
declaration with the Dutch Foreign Ministry in its capacity as
keeper of the treaty repository formally explaining its opposition to
the sorts of fees imposed by the United States, though the
declaration does not mention any specific country or contractor.
The declaration reads:
The Russian Federation assumes that in accordance with
Article 12 of the Convention the service of judicial
documents coming from a Contracting State shall not give
rise to any payment or reimbursement of taxes or costs for
the services rendered by the State addressed. Collection of
such costs (with the exception of those provided for by
subparagraphs a) and b) of the second paragraph of Article
12) by any Contracting State shall be viewed by the Russian
Federation as refusal to uphold the Convention in relation
to the Russian Federation, and, consequently, the Russian
Federation shall not apply the Convention in relation to this
Contracting State.46

State Department Website, supra note 9.
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE PRACTICAL
OPERATION OF THE HAGUE APOSTILLE, EVIDENCE AND SERVICE CONVENTIONS 10 (Nov.
20, 2003), http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/lse_concl_e.pdf [hereinafter
SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT]. The Special Commission included representatives
of 57 member states. Id. at 3.
45 State Department Website, supra note 9.
46 See Russian reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters of 15 November 1965, available at http://www.hcch.net
43
44
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A series of meetings at which the U.S. interpretation of the
Convention has been endorsed by the Hague Conference has failed
to persuade Russia to modify its position.47
2.

RUSSIA’S APPEAL TO ARTICLE 12: FISHY CIRCUMSTANCES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUGGEST THAT THE ARTICLE 12
ARGUMENT IS A RED HERRING

Russia’s explanation for its decision to suspend Convention
assistance to the United States appears pretextual for a number of
reasons. To begin with, the odd timeline of the Russo-American
dispute and Russia’s own approach to its Hague Service
Convention obligations suggest that Russia’s legal argument may
be insincere.
The weakness of Russia’s position under
international law further suggests that considerations other than
compliance with international legal obligations influenced Russian
policy in this case. This is the case of regardless to whether the
Russian declaration is analyzed as a reservation or as a
countermeasure. Finally, the text of Russia’s pre-reservation
ratification legislation indicates that Russia had long understood
and accepted that fees might be charged for effecting service before
radically changing its position in 2003.
2.1. The Curious Timing of Russia’s Hague Service Convention
Participation and Policies Reveal Three International Law
Violations
The lag time between Russia’s accession to the Convention, its
suspension of Convention assistance to the United States, its
formal reservation, and its fulfillment of its own obligations under
the treaty raise a red flag. As a party to the Vienna Convention,48
/upload/decl14_ru.pdf, translated in Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Declarations Reservations, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status
.comment&csid=418&disp=resdn (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); see also State
Department Website, supra note 9 (reprinting and briefly discussing the Russian
declaration).
47 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Seminar, Ekaterinburg,
Russ., May 15–16, 2008, Hague 1965 Service Convention & Hague 1970 Evidence
Convention,
http://www.hcch.net/upload/ekaterinburg_conclusions_e.pdf
[hereinafter Ekaterinburg Seminar]; Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Second Seminar, Saint Petersburg, Russ., Jan. 30–31, 2007, Service of Process
Under the Hague 1965 Service Convention, http://www.hcch.net/upload
/spseminar_concl_e.pdf.
48 See Krug, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Russia is obligated to abide by its provisions, including those
governing preservation of a treaty’s object and purpose49 and those
regulating treaty reservations.50 By unilaterally suspending the
Convention with regard to the United States, entering an invalid
reservation, and failing to abide by the terms of the Hague Service
Convention, Russia demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward
international legal obligations that is at odds with the country’s
hard-line interpretation of Article 12 of the Convention.
2.1.1.

Suspension of the Convention in 2003 Violated
International Law

International law applies to all states “and every state is
obliged to give it effect.”51
A foundational principle of
international law is pacta sunt servanda; even a domestic
constitutional conflict does not excuse treaty violations under
international law.52 In any case, no such conflict exists in Russia.
In addition to Russia’s constitutional approval of the supremacy of
international treaties,53 domestic Russian legislation on treaty
interpretation and application mirrors Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention, providing that actions by a treaty signatory which
would deprive a treaty “of its object and purposes” violate
international law.54 Taking its cue from the Vienna Convention,
Russian legislation would allow suspension of the nation’s treaty
obligations in the face of a material breach by another state party.55
However, the U.S. privatization and fee structure are simply not a
material breach of the Convention. The Hague Conference

Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 18.
See, e.g., Francesco Parisi & Catherine Ševčenko, Treaty Reservations and the
Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2003)
(describing provisions of the Vienna Convention governing reservations).
51 Kim M. Forcino, Note, International Service of Process: The Trend Moves Away
From Uniformity, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 485, 499 (1996) (citing LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (3d ed. 1993)).
52 See, e.g., William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and
National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251
(2006) (examining the intersection of international law principles and the U.S.
domestic legal system).
53 See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution], supra
notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
54 WILLIAM E. BUTLER, THE LAW OF TREATIES IN RUSSIA AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 49 (2002).
55 Id. at 200.
49
50
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addressed the issue three decades ago, explaining that the primary
problem of fees was the difficulty “in determining the amount of
and obtaining a check for payment in a foreign currency,” not the
charging of fees or any particular fee amount.56 These problems
are now more easily overcome than they were in 1977. It does not
help the Russian case that, under similar circumstances, the Soviet
Union charged a processing fee for handling letters of request for
judicial assistance under the Moscow Agreement prior to Russia’s
accession to the Hague Service Convention.57
Nor is there any indication that delegating duties to a private
company is a material breach, as long as the United States retains
ultimate responsibility, which it has.58 Indeed, discussion in the
Russian legal community has advocated such outsourcing to
improve Russia’s own Hague Service Convention performance.59
To this end, Russia currently uses commercial courier services to
transmit requests abroad and commercial translation services to
translate outgoing requests from Russian into the necessary
language—practices mentioned with approval by the Hague
Conference.60 Such use of private companies to support improved
performance of a country’s Convention obligations thus only
appears to bother Russia when it takes place in the United States.

56 Georges A.L. Droz, A Comment on the Role of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6 (1994).
57 Tatyana Gidirimski, Comment, Service of United States Process in Russia
Under Rule 4(F) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 691,
702 (2001).
58 See Letter from United States to Hague Conference Depositary, supra note
33 (stating that the U.S. has decided to outsource the Central Authority’s service
of process activity to a private company).
59 See A.E. Zueva, Problemy primeneniia gaagskoi konventsii 1965 goda O
vruchenii sudebnykh i vnesudebnykh dokumentov po grazhdanskim i torgovym delam,
ARBITRAZHNYE SPORY, [Problems/Questions in Applying the 1965 Hague
Convention on Service of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters], Mar. 23, 2007, available at http://www.kadis.ru/daily
/dayprof.phtml?id=36360 (suggesting that the “American experience” with a
private organization responsible for forwarding Hague service requests could be
successfully applied in Russia).
60 See Ekaterinburg Seminar, supra note 47 (noting the great progress that has
been made in Russia with regard to the “effective implementation” of the Hague
Service Convention, especially in expediting service requests).
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Russia’s Reservation after Ratification Is Ineffective Under
the Vienna Convention

Russia’s violation of the Convention is not cured by its
statement, even if one interprets its declaration regarding Article
12 as a reservation.
The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as “a unilateral
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”61
The language of the Vienna Convention indicates that reservations
must be made prior to ratification.62 As noted above, Russia
ratified the Hague Service Convention in 2001, suspended judicial
cooperation in 2003, and formally entered its reservation in 2004.63
Russia’s reservation thus came too late to satisfy the requirements
of the Vienna Convention, violating the Convention’s implied
prohibition of reservations after ratification and failing to cure
Russia’s continuing violation of the Convention with regard to the
United States.
2.1.3.

Russia Failed to Provide a Functioning Central Authority
for Four Years, Violating a Fundamental Hague Service
Convention Obligation

Russia’s strict stance regarding Article 12 of the Convention
appears peculiar given the country’s failure to provide member
states access to a functioning Central Authority of its own until
2005.64 In fact, the Russian government first identified its Central

Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 2(1)(d).
See, e.g., Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations
Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 331
(2005) (noting that “there is no basis in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties for a reservation after ratification”).
63 See supra Section 1 (providing an overview of the Hague Service
Convention).
64 See Service of Process Under the Hague 1965 Service Convention—A
Seminar of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, October 4–5 2005,
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/concl14_2005en.pdf (“welcoming” the
Russian government’s designation of a Central Authority); see also Zueva, supra
note 59 (noting that the Russian Federation signed and ratified the Convention in
2001, but only designated the Ministry of Justice as its Convention “Central
Authority” in 2005).
61
62
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Authority by presidential decree only in August of 2004.65
Insistence on a fine point of treaty interpretation hardly seems
appropriate coming from a state that has failed to meet the most
basic obligation of the treaty regime.66
2.2. Russia’s Implementing Legislation Anticipated Reciprocal Fees
and Alternative Central Authorities
Russia memorialized the terms of its accession to the
Convention in a federal statute.67 This statute indicates in two
ways that the Russian Federation expected regimes of reciprocal
fees to exist. First, Article 26 of the statute specifically authorizes
state parties to request reimbursement for service-related expenses,
and notes that “when a state requests [such fees], any other
agreeing state may request reciprocal fees from that state.”68
Second, the statute features a “dog that didn’t bark.” Article 12 of
the statute provides that a state may refuse service under the
Convention where the service requested is beyond the authority of
the court addressed, or where such service would infringe state
sovereignty or damage state security.69 Assuming that expressio
unius est exclusion alterius translates into Russian, these specific
grounds for refusing service preclude additional rationales not
expressed in the statute.70
65 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot Aug. 24, 2004 N. 1101 “O
Tsentral’nom Organe Rossiiskoi Federatsii Po Konventsii O Vruchenii Za
Granitsei Sudebnykh i Vnesudebnykh Dokumentov Po Grazhdanskim Ili
Torgovym Delam” [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 24
August 2004 No. 1101 “Regarding the Central Authority of the Russian Federation
under the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters”] available at http://www.minjust
.rostov.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=60&Itemid=48
(designating the Russian Ministry of Justice as Convention Central Authority).
66 See Hawkins supra note 14, at 213–15 (discussing the essential importance
of the Central Authority in the Hague Service Convention system).
67 See Russian Implementing Statute, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
68 Id. art. 26.
69 Id. art. 12.
70 Research has not revealed any indication that the U.S. Hague Service
Convention interpretation might conflict with the Russian Constitution, which
would be a conceivable alternative ground for Russia’s refusal to uphold its
Convention obligations toward the United States. See Konstitutsiia Rossiskoi
Federatsi [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 125 cl. 6 (Russ.) (mandating that “[a]cts or
their certain provisions recognized as unconstitutional shall become invalid;
international treaties and agreements not corresponding to the Constitution of the
Russian Federation shall not be liable for enforcement and application”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

606

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.
2.2.1.

[Vol. 31:2

The Opinion of the Special Commission and State Practice
Confirm That the United States’ Hague Service Convention
Practices Are Legal

As noted above, the Special Commission clearly indicated that
the United States may privatize and charge a fee for its Central
Authority functions.71 This opinion is only strengthened by
evidence of state practice.
Under international law, concrete actions taken by states are
“weighed most heavily as evidence of state practice.”72 It is thus
significant that other countries charge fees to cover the costs of
service. Canada, for example, charged a fee for effecting service
under the Convention before the United States outsourced to PFI.73
Other states, such as Italy and China, have responded to the
charging of fees by PFI by merely charging reciprocal fees rather
than suspending cooperation entirely.74 Russia’s hard-line refusal
to extend any judicial assistance under the Convention whatsoever
is a clear outlier in this context.
2.2.2.

As a Countermeasure, Russia’s Suspension of Cooperation
is Excessive

Interpreting Russia’s suspension of Convention assistance to
the United States as a countermeasure, it once again appears that
Russia is in violation of its international legal obligations. Under
international law, countermeasures must be deployed for the
purpose of inducing the other state’s “future compliance with
international law” and “must be proportionate to the violation they
seek to remedy.”75 Thus, for example, states that object to the
71 See Special Commission Report, supra note 44 (stating that each state party
is free to “determine its own model” of Central Authority organization, including
“contracting activities under the Convention to a private entity” while retaining
the formal status and responsibility of the Central Authority under the
Convention).
72 Stephanie L. Kotecki, Comment, The Human Rights Costs of China’s Arms
Sales to Sudan: A Violation of International Law on Two Fronts, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y
J. 209, 214 (2008) (citation omitted).
73 See Johnson, supra note 32, at 786 (“Prior to PFI’s contract, Canada was the
only signatory to the Hague Service Convention to declare a specific fee for
service of process. . . Still other states impose reciprocal fees upon countries
charging fees for service.”).
74 Id.
75
John C. Dehn, Permissible Perfidy? Analysing the Colombian Hostage Rescue,
the Capture of Rebel Leaders and the World’s Reaction, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 627, 648
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United States charging fees for service through PFI have charged
reciprocal fees for service requests originating in the United
States.76 Russia, meanwhile, has elected to suspend performance of
its obligations under the treaty entirely. Though non-performance
might be an allowable countermeasure under some
circumstances,77 it hardly seems proportionate where lesser
measures, namely the charging of reciprocal fees, are readily
available and are just as likely to encourage the United States to
adopt Russia’s position.
3.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR RUSSIA’S HAGUE SERVICE
CONVENTION POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

It thus appears unlikely that international law motivated
Russia to adopt its interpretation of the Convention. Rather, the
facts of the Russo-American Hague Service Convention dispute are
consistent with alternative explanations characterizing the Russian
suspension of judicial cooperation as a foreign policy conflict, not a
legal decision. This theory is borne out by contemporary political
developments in the Russo-American relationship, which
underwent a dramatic shift just as Russia’s Hague Service
Convention policy toward the United States suddenly changed. It
is also consistent with structural and historical characteristics of the
Russian legal system which make Russian private international law
policy particularly susceptible to executive-branch influence
relative to other nations, including the United States.

(2008). See also Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The
Attractions of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313, 329 (2008)
(applying countermeasures principles in the context of World Trade Organization
disputes, noting that “the general regime on countermeasures in public
international law explicitly provides that a state injured by a wrongful act may
only take countermeasures against the state responsible in order to induce that
state to comply with its obligations”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
76 See Johnson, supra note 32, at 786 (noting that countries such as Italy and
China have adjusted to require payment for certain service of process after this
day).
77 Dehn, supra note 75, at 649 (“Countermeasures are ‘limited to the nonperformance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking’ the
countermeasures.”) (citation omitted).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

608

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:2

3.1. The Iraq War and the Hague Service Convention Dispute:
Matching Timelines
After September 11, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin
was the first foreign leader to call U.S. President George W. Bush to
offer his condolences and assistance.78 The sincerity of Russian
support was demonstrated by significant, concrete Russian help in
the early stages of Washington’s Global War on Terror, including
the exercise of Russian influence in Central Asia to allow the use of
airspace and airfields critical to operations in Afghanistan.79 This
cooperative spirit extended to arms reductions talks that same
year, suggesting that a new era had dawned in Russian foreign
policy towards the United States.80
However, as the United States prepared to invade Iraq in the
spring of 2003, Russian support melted away. Putin ultimately
made it clear that he “firmly opposed” the invasion.81 The Iraq
question was widely considered a bellwether for the future of
Russian foreign policy toward the United States,82 and seems to
have indeed been a turning point in relations between the two
countries. Since the invasion, the Russo-American relationship has
been marked by a deepening series of disagreements.83
78 See, e.g., Robin Wright, Ties That Terrorism Transformed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2002, at 4 (referencing the Putin call).
79 See, e.g., Editorial, Good From Evil: Terrorism United U.S., Russia to End Arms
Race, BRADENTON HERALD (Florida), Nov. 16, 2001, at 10C (emphasizing the
importance of Russia’s role in the fight against terrorism where Russia and the
U.S. have “put aside differences and allied against a common enemy,” bin Laden
and his Al Qaida network).
80 See, e.g., Bob Kemper, Russia, U.S. Go Forward on Arms: Nuclear Weapons,
ABM Pact on Table, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 2001, at 1 (reporting that Bush and Putin
had “made progress on a plan to dramatically reduce their nations’ nuclear
arsenals”); see also Editorial, Putin’s Terrible Dilemma, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 8,
2003, at 6 (observing that Putin had taken “sizeable political risks” at home by
supporting U.S. efforts to secure Central Asian basing for U.S. troops and U.S.
policy regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty).
81 C. J. Chivers, Russia Parades Its Military In an Echo of Soviet Days, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2008, at A9.
82 See, e.g., Michael Wines, Putin’s Daunting Choice: Which West to Join, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at A12 (discussing the decision Russia must make between
supporting either Europe or America).
83 See Peter Grier, Crises Cast Doubt on Bush’s Strategy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Aug. 20, 2008 (noting the shift in relations between the United States
and Russia from the first Bush-Putin meeting in 2001 to the 2008 Russian invasion
of Georgia); see also David Rising, Russia: Better U.S. Ties Will Take Time, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 9, 2009, at 17 (noting hiccups in U.S. relations with Russia, including disputes
over NATO expansion and American military bases in Central Asia); Fred Hiatt,
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Russia’s embrace of the Hague Service Convention and
subsequent decision to consider the United States in breach of the
Convention corresponds roughly with the timeline described
above, with a positive development in 2001 followed by a marked
downturn in relations in the summer of 2003. Russia acceded to
the Hague Service Convention in 2001, with the Convention
entering into force in Russia that same year.84 However, in July of
2003, as the war in Iraq continued, Russia notified the United
States that it would no longer process U.S. requests for service sent
pursuant to the Hague Service Convention.85
3.2. The Role of Civil Law Discomfort With Common Law Litigation
Practices: Present, But Not Decisive
Brought up in the civil law tradition, Russian lawyers tend to
approach litigation and service of process in particular quite
differently from their common law counterparts.
As Born
observes, “[c]ivil law states generally regard service of judicial
process as a sovereign act that may be performed in their territory
only by the state’s own officials and in accordance with its own
law.”86 This is certainly the case in Russia, which does not
officially recognize service other than that effected by—not merely
through—Russian courts.87 Judges in Russia, in keeping with
standard civil law practice, are responsible for directing pretrial
litigation in areas reserved for the parties themselves in common
law systems.88 Since the gap between the two systems is so wide,
A Russia Reality Check, WASH. POST, B7, Feb. 8, 2009 (describing conflicting foreign
policies of Russia and the U.S. since the fall of the Soviet Union). Given the recent
controversy over the role of Russian influence in the Kyrgyz government’s
decision to reconsider the United States’ use of Manas Air Force Base in Bishkek,
the contrast between the current state of affairs and Russia’s strong support in
Central Asia in 2001 is especially stark.
84 Service Convention Hague Status Table, supra note 3.
85 See State Department Web site, supra note 9.
86 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 774 (1996) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 471, cmt. B (1987)).
87 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Response Russian
Federation to 2008 Service Questionnaire 19 (2008), available at http://hcch.e
-vision.nl/upload/wop/2008russianfederation14.pdf [hereinafter RUSSIAN HAGUE
QUESTIONNAIRE] (noting “[m]ethods other than a formal service are not provided
for in the Russian legislation”).
88 See, e.g., Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 696 (discussing the role of the judge in
the Russian court system vis-à-vis pre-trial discovery).
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and the potential for offense to civil law judges by common law
litigators so great, bridging this difference is a major challenge the
Hague Service Convention and its ilk must overcome, as their
critics often mention.89
Though it is difficult to isolate legal-cultural distance as a
cause, it is interesting to note that the overwhelming majority of
incoming requests for service reported by the Russian Federation
Central Authority between 2004 and 2007 are from other civil law
countries, with Great Britain hovering near the bottom of the list as
the sole exception.90
Yet the civil law/common law distinction alone does not
explain Russia’s suspension of judicial assistance solely with the
United States. Though Great Britain is near the bottom of the list, it
is still on the list, indicating that common law systems themselves
are not so repugnant to Russia that it refuses to deal with them all.
Further, the Russian implementing statute creates a mechanism to
interface with a common law system.91 Thus, in practice and on
paper, it seems Russia is prepared to cooperate with states that
have common law legal systems. A deeper analysis into Russian
legal culture is therefore necessary to determine why the Russian
government refuses to cooperate with the United States.
3.3. Russian Legal History and Culture and the Development of
Russian Private International Law Policy
Particularly from an American perspective, private
international law in Russia seems difficult to distinguish from
“public” foreign policy. As discussed above,92 Russia is a civil law
country, requiring far more direct court participation in pre-trial
service and evidence gathering procedures than is common in the
United States.93 Yet, beyond this basic distinction, there is a
89 See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1190–91 (describing the limited utility
of the Hague conventions because of their failure to reconcile common law and
civil law trial differences).
90 RUSSIAN HAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE supra note 87, at 9.
91 Russian Implementing Statute, supra note 25, art. 23.
92 See supra Section 3.2.
93 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives Into the
First Year Civil Procedure Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 492–93 (2006)
(highlighting distinction in service regimes between civil and common law
jurisdictions); see also Johnson, supra note 32, at 777 (noting that distinctions
between private and public law matters in civil law countries are relatively
“complex”); Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 695 (noting “U.S. litigants are generally
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traditional melding of public and private legal relationships in
Russia,94 and a subordination of the law and lawyers to decisionmakers up the chain that results in a fundamentally different
approach to private international law in Russia. Sadly, “law and
lawyers have not traditionally been accorded much power or
status in Russia.”95 Legal developments in Russia are thus not
guided by the legal profession, but are rather taking place in a field
that has long been subordinated to power-centers elsewhere in the
society. It is thus necessary to consider this private international
law dispute not merely in terms of the relationship between two
legal establishments, but the relations between two fairly hostile
states.96
This is consistent with a long history of private
international law policy’s place in the Russian executive’s toolbox
of foreign policy options, as described below.
3.3.1.

Imperial Russian Private International Law Policy

Russian private international law policy has its foundations in
Russia’s early participation in the formation of the formal modern
private international law establishment. The Russian Empire was a
founding member of the Hague Conference, and a party to the
Conference’s first Hague Convention, the Hague Convention on
Civil Procedure, which entered into force on May 23, 1899.97 Czar
Nicholas II was active in international organizations of the time,
playing an “instrumental” role in disarmament conferences that
same year.98 This policy of active engagement abroad led scholars
to conclude that international institutions “played important roles

unaccustomed to the view held by civil law countries that service of process is a
sovereign act that must be carried out by state officials according to state law”).
94 See FRANCES NETHERCOTT, RUSSIAN LEGAL CULTURE BEFORE AND AFTER
COMMUNISM: CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 146 (2007)
(observing, in the context of Russian criminal law reform, that the distinction
between the private and public spheres has been “traditionally a blind spot in
Russian legal culture”).
95 GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (1996).
96 See supra Section 3.1. (explaining recent breakdown of diplomatic relations
between the United States and Russia following the Iraq war).
97 Droz, supra note 56, at 3.
98 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow’s Diplomacy in International Organizations, in
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF GEORGE GINSBURGS 339, 339 (Roger Clark et al. eds., 2001).
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in Russia’s diplomacy of safeguarding and advancing state
interests.”99
After the October Revolution of 1917, the attitude of the
Russian government to the outside world became somewhat more
complicated. Pragmatic use of private international law channels,
however, continued.
3.3.2.

Private International Law in the Soviet Era

As the Western world began to accept the Soviet government
as a long-term member of the international establishment, the
Soviet foreign policy administration expressed a willingness to
participate in international organizations—even with non-socialist
countries.100 In the 1930s, the Soviet Union thus entered into
various international agreements, many of which had private
international law implications.
These included international
commercial arbitration agreements of various sorts,101 and the 1935
“Moscow Agreement” between the Soviet Union and the United
States.102 However, while these agreements concerned commercial
relationships, they were hardly “private” international law. Given
the politicization of commercial activity in the Soviet Union, this is
unsurprising. More importantly, this was consistent with Soviet
international law theory, which generally maintained that
international law “directly affects only the rights and duties of the
state proper,” not private citizens.103
Trade agreements with foreign countries were doubly
compartmentalized, as the Soviet state’s ideological and foreign
policy commitments naturally made the Soviet Government wary
of allowing private citizens direct contact with non-Soviet
Id.
See id., at 340 (discussing the famous Litvinov speech of September 18,
1934 and stating that there was nothing “theoretically unacceptable” about all the
Soviet states engaging in an association with non-socialist states).
101 See, e.g., William B. Simons, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Under Russian Law: The (Ab)Use of The Public Policy Doctrine in Russian Courts, in
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE 373, 399 (Roger
Clark et al. eds., 2001) (discussing Soviet-era international arbitration agreements
between the Soviet Union and other nations).
102 The Moscow Agreement remained an important element in Russo-U.S.
relations even after the fall of the Soviet Union. See Gidirimski, supra note 57, at
706 (discussing applicability of the “Moscow Agreement” in 2001, prior to
Russia’s Hague Service Convention accession).
103 GEORGE GINSBURGS, FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW : STUDIES
IN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1 (1998).
99

100
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enterprises.104 Thus, all foreign trade from the 1930s through the
Gorbachev years was conducted through a government monopoly
administered by Foreign Trade Organizations [“FTOs”].105 These
FTOs were in turn the subjects of international arbitration
agreements between the Soviet Union and various Western
countries, described as a “logical comprise to a mutual
suspicion . . . of each other’s judicial and political systems.”106
As the agreements were conducted on a case-by-case basis,
there was surprisingly little consistency from treaty to treaty. The
Soviet Union’s trademark “uniformity and standardization” in
other political and economic policy thus did not apply to trade
treaties, even concerning such important issues as the terms of a
public policy exception.107 Characterized by expediency, these
agreements apparently gave “little regard to . . . systematic and
theoretical issues . . . .”108 In addition, these agreements were
generally vague on procedural details such as mechanisms for
bringing enforcement actions.109
Nor was the Soviet Union keen to recognize customary
international law as a gap-filler. Soviet legal theory “emphasized
the place of the treaty” as the principal source of international law
to the detriment of customary international law.110 This was
consistent with the Soviet government’s general wariness of
international law that it had not taken part in making, as such law
“was considered to have taken shape under the influence of
capitalist states and to contain propositions that did not square
with the Soviet Union’s approach.”111 However, while even Soviet
scholars recognized that Cold War expediency caused Soviet

104 Indeed, foreign direct investment was prohibited in the Soviet Union until
1987. Simons, supra note 101, at 381 n.14.
105 Id. at 387.
106 Id. at 388.
107 Id. at 391.
108 KAZIMIERZ GRYZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (1965).
109 See Simons, supra note 101, at 390–91 (explaining that applications to
enforce foreign arbitral awards were made at higher level courts).
110 See BUTLER, supra note 54, at 5-6 (noting that the Preamble marks a
significant departure from traditional Soviet theory of international law, which
identified the treaty as the main source of international law, which differed from
general Soviet procedural rules for obtaining enforcement of domestic court
judgments).
111 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 61 (internal citation omitted).
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violations of international law,112 the Soviet Union’s record in
international commercial law was apparently quite respectable
when it suited the government’s purpose. Soviet FTOs, for
example, consistently honored adverse arbitration awards made
pursuant to international arbitration agreements in the mid to late
Soviet period.113
3.4. Post-Soviet Transition
In its last years, the Soviet Union saw the beginnings of a shift
in international law theory and policy. By the late Gorbachev
period, arguments appeared in the literature advocating against
international law being “artificially divided into capitalist
international law, socialist international law, and the international
law of developing countries.”114 Soviet scholars thus began to
revisit their hesitancy regarding Russian participation in a world
legal system beyond treaties.115 In 1993, the Duma enacted a law
on commercial arbitration in an effort to tap into “the international
harmonization of commercial law,” the first time a “broad
legislative basis” anchored the international system to the Russian
domestic legal system.116 In 1995, Russia’s basic law on treaties, the
Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of
the Russian Federation, explicitly recognized the role of customary
international law and Russia’s obligation to follow it.117 Similar
112 See Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Reina A. Müllerson, The Primacy of
International Law in World Politics, in PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 6, 8
(Anthony Carty & Gennady Danilenko eds., 1990) (“Regretfully, the Soviet Union
is not blameless in its approach to international law.”).
113 Simons, supra note 101, at 394, 413–15 (arguing that, although there were
no reports of a Soviet FTO refusing to honor an award against it, a reasonable
investor might have insisted on certain conditions surrounding enforcement).
114 Vereshchetin & Müllerson, supra note 112, at 9.
115 Compare G.I. Tunkin, On the Primacy of International Law in Politics, in
PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112, reprinted in RUSSIAN LEGAL
THEORY, at 609–16 (W. E. Butler ed. 1996) (arguing that the primacy of
international law is necessary for the normal functioning of the inter-State
system), with G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (L.N. Shestakov &
William E. Butler eds., William E. Butler, trans., Wildy, Simmonds & Hill
Publishers Ltd. 2d ed. 2003) (2000) (explaining the principles of “socialist
internationalism”).
116 Simons, supra note 101, at 398–99.
117 See BUTLER, supra note 54, at 5. (“The Russian Federation favours
undeviating compliance with treaty and customary norms and affirms its
adherence to the basic principle of international law—the principle of the goodfaith fulfillment of international obligations.”).
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language appears in the Russian Constitution.118 Finally, Russia
formally rejoined the Hague Conference on Private International
Law on December 6, 2001.119
Nevertheless, progress was mixed across Russia’s international
law portfolio, including in the private international law arena.
First, structural peculiarities of Russia’s treaty-making and judicial
systems make it difficult to understand the system. Treaty-making
authority is delegated to a variety of state organs, including courts,
in the Russian Federation.120 The Supreme Arbitration Court is an
interesting example. The court is something of a Soviet holdover,
as it has its roots in Soviet forums designed to deal with foreign
trade in the era of FTOs.121 The court’s responsibilities regarding
foreign trade relationships continue: the court “presented” the
legislation to the Duma that resulted in Russia’s accession to the
Hague Service Convention,122 and is officially responsible for
establishing and maintaining “international relationships and
cooperation with supreme courts and specialized courts of various
foreign countries.”123
Yet the Arbitration Courts, like others in Russia, have suffered
from a lack of judges trained in international law and treaty

118 See Tatiana V. Tkachenko, National and International Aspects of Russian
Insolvency Law: Problems and Possible Solutions, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC 751, 764
(2008) (“Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates the
principle that international treaties and widely accepted principles of
international law are part of the Russian legal system.”).
119 Press Release, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Russian
Federation Rejoins the Hague Conference (June 12, 2001), available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2001&varevent
=19.
120 See William E. Butler, Treaty Capacity and the Russian State Corporation, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 315 (2008) (noting that such “empowered organizations” act as
government ministries or state committees “for most treaty purposes” under
current Russian legislation). It is unclear, however, if such “interdepartmental”
treaties, which are not ratified by the Federal Assembly, take precedence over
Russian federal law. Id. at 313.
121 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 141 (stating the Procedural Code of
Arbitration of the Russian Federation “broadens the jurisdiction of arbitration
courts to include cases involving foreign organizations, organizations with foreign
investments, international organizations, the citizens and stateless persons
engaged in entrepreneurial activity”).
122 Tkachenko, supra note 118, at 765. This court played a similar role in
Russia’s accession to the Hague Evidence Convention. Id.
123 Id.
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interpretation.124 This is a holdover of the limited role of judges in
the Soviet system, who were “excessively dependent” on
directions from the political leadership for guidance.125 Though socalled “telephone law” has reportedly diminished greatly since the
days when Soviet bureaucrats would literally pick up the phone to
inform judges of their decisions, the generation of Russian judges
used to “detailed and didactic” instructions from legislation or
leaders has not wholly died out.126 What’s more, salaries and
benefits for judges are subject to manipulation as they are “only
partly defined in the law,” and are relatively low.127
This has serious consequences for Russia’s international law
practice, if not its policy. In the Soviet period, treaty interpretation
was the province of government ministries, generally the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs or, in the case of economic treaties, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade.128 Though Russian courts may have the power to
strike down legislation that violates international law, they must be
prepared to exercise that power for it to mean anything.
In sum, Russian international law policy, including private
international law policy, remains more a political tool than an
independent legal framework. While this system has maintained
fairly good compliance with international law in some areas,129 the
dominance of political rather than legal actors may make Russia’s
positions more unpredictable and harder to justify under
international or even domestic Russian law. Russia’s decision to
suspend Hague Service Convention assistance to the United States
may well stem from this power structure.
4.

CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIA’S HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
POLICY: THE IMPACT ON LITIGANTS IN U.S. COURTS AND

124 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 121 (noting the poor international law
training received by judges and a shortage of international law specialists
practicing in Russia); id. at 141 (describing an “acute need” for Arbitration Court
judges to be educated on international law).
125 Id. at 122.
126 Simons, supra note 101, at 468.
127 Donald D. Barry, Decision-Making and Dissent in the Russian Federation
Constitutional Court, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 10, at 1,10.
128 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 119–20.
129 Id. at 146 (noting that although “Russia’s performance in the law
department lags far behind that of the leaders of the pack,” it is still ahead of
many other countries).
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
4.1. Consequences for Litigants in U.S. Courts
Russia’s Hague Service Convention policy clearly impacts
parties in U.S. courts with a need to effect service on Russian soil.
Recognizing that the Convention is effectively a dead letter
between the United States and Russia; U.S. federal district courts
have authorized alternate service under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which would otherwise require compliance with the
Hague Service Convention regime.130 This flexibility, however,
does not offer much comfort to parties that may need to pursue
enforcement actions on Russian soil.131
With the primary Convention channel out of commission, none
of the alternatives identified by the Convention are officially
available. Russia is not a party to any bilateral treaty allowing for
direct judicial communication,132 does not recognize any form of
service other than official service through Russian courts,133 and
thus does not provide for alternate service via fax, email, or any
other method,134 except for consular channels.135 Setting aside the
fact that the Hague Service Convention is in large part designed to
address the general ineffectiveness of consular channels as a means
of effecting service,136 Russia reportedly does not honor such
requests from the United States.137
130 See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Media Servs. LLC, No. 06 Civ.15319, 2008
WL 563470 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008) (permitting alternative service in light of
Russia’s refusal to allow U.S. litigants to utilize Hague Service Convention
procedures). As discussed in Section 3, supra, U.S. courts have allowed alternate
methods of service consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s due process
requirements where the Hague Service Convention is not functioning. See, e.g.,
Arista Records, 2008 WL 563470, at *1 (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(f)).
131 Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 695–96.
132 RUSSIAN HAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 87, at 12.
133 Id. at 18–19.
134 Id. at 22.
135 Id. at 24.
136 See, e.g., Panagiota Kelali, Comment, Provisional Relief in Transnational
Litigation in the Internet Era: What is in the US Best Interest?, 24 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 263, 270 n.39 (2006) (discussing slow, cumbersome nature of
requests through official diplomatic channels in the context of cybercrime
investigations) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Robert M.
Kimmitt, International Law in the War on Narcotics, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 302,
306 (1990) (describing the traditional letters-rogatory system as “less efficient”));
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In sum, U.S. litigants are now worse off than they were before
Russia signed the Convention. Suspension of the Convention
essentially sets the clock back to 2001, when observers noted that
letters of request through diplomatic channels were the only
realistic means of effecting service in Russia that could potentially
support a later enforcement action through Russian courts.138 With
the diplomatic channel non-functional as well, no options remain
to parties in U.S. courts that satisfy both Russian domestic law and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.139
4.2. International Arbitration: Viable Alternative or Fire to the
Convention’s Frying Pan?
Unfortunately, international arbitration may not be an
attractive alternative to the sorts of transnational litigation which
require working Hague Service Convention channels between the
United States and Russia. Judgments won in arbitral proceedings
must still be enforced where the losing party’s assets are located.
Russia’s record in this respect is mixed.140 If anything, Russian
courts may be “gradually becoming more hostile to the
enforcement of arbitration awards.”141 The same “gap between
theory and practice” that characterizes Russia’s Hague Service

see also Tamayo, supra note 21, at 232 (describing situation in which the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia “permitted service of process only through letters rogatory, a
slow process requiring government intervention and taking up to one-and-a-half
years to complete”) (citing Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2002)).
137 See State Department Website, supra note 9 (“In July 2003, Russia
suspended all judicial cooperation with the United States in civil and commercial
matters.”).
138 Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 707.
139 For an analysis of this Catch 22 prior to Russia’s ratification of the Hague
Service Convention, see id. at 707-08, 714-15.
140 See William R. Spiegelberger, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in
Russia: An Analysis of the Relevant Treaties, Laws, And Cases, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
261, 304 (2005) (observing that “Russian courts seem to enforce foreign arbitration
awards at a rate lower than the international average,” despite procedural and
substantive law consistent with the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL
Model Law).
141 Daniel S. Meyers, In Defense of the International Treaty Arbitration System, 31
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 47, 77 n.160 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Convention policy thus seems to impact its participation in
international arbitration systems.142
5.

CONCLUSION

Despite the best efforts of the Hague Conference, the RussoAmerican Hague Service Convention impasse continues. The
episode does not bode well for the future of the Russo-American
relationship and is especially alarming to parties that might need
workable transnational commercial litigation channels between the
two countries.
The dispute is also strong evidence that transnational
commercial litigation is likely to remain “complex, difficult, and
inefficient.”143 . As this failure of the Hague Conference proves its
critics right,144 it should spur the Conference and its members to
redouble their efforts to strive toward a “uniform normative
framework” in which the global community can craft international
legal solutions.145 Demand for such a framework will not soon
vanish; where there are international transactions, there will be
international litigation.146 Indeed, because functional private
international law regimes can be considered not merely a result of,
but a prerequisite to robust global economic development,147 the
consequences of continued failure in this arena are more serious
than procedural headaches, delays or inconvenience. On the bright
side, the Russo-American experience with the Hague Service

142 Spiegelberger, supra note 140, at 304; see also Bernard S. Black, The Legal
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781,
826 n.55 (2001) (“In Russia, for example, courts routinely refuse to enforce
international arbitration awards and sometimes reject claims by foreign creditors
on peculiar grounds.”).
143 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1118.
144 Id. at 1190–91 (citations omitted).
145 Christophe Bernasconi, Some Observations from the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 350 (2007).
146 See Dowling, supra note 17, at 465 (“You cannot set up a deal properly if
you do not plan for what will happen if the deal goes bad.”).
147 See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 71 (2008) (“Good courts are central to sustained economic
development.”); see also Meyers, supra note 141 at 56–58 (noting that, despite
disagreement as to whether “increasing legal protections for foreign investments
actually increases the volume of such investments,” and whether increasing
foreign investment actually increases economic development, nobody has yet
proven otherwise).
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Convention may serve to identify the political and cultural hurdles
the Hague Conference must clear to realize its goals.
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